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Mapping SKS into a TEE/SE "Combo"

An SKS (Secure Key Store) may be self-contained like in a smart card, but it may also be architected as a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) and SE (Security Element) combination.

The primary objectives for dividing an SKS into a TEE/SE combo include:

- Small SE footprint suitable for CPU integration
- Stateless SE-operation enabling simple virtualization
- Unlimited key storage
- Elimination of NVRAM
- Logical integration in modern operating systems

The described scheme is intended to work equally well in mobile phones as in high-performance servers.

The reader is supposed to be familiar with the SKS specification

https://openkeystore.googlecode.com/svn/resources/trunk/docs/sks-api-arch.pdf

TEE/SE Combination

Sample “User API” Operation

* Acquired by the OS



Anatomy of a *SealedKey*

```
class SealedKey
  {
    byte[] wrappedKey;       // Encrypted PKCS #8 or symmetric key
    boolean isSymmetric;     // True if wrapped_key is symmetric
    boolean isExportable;    // True if allowed to be unsealed to the TEE
    byte[] mac;              // Integrity control
  }
```

Sealing Algorithm:

byte[] IV = randomNumber (16);
wrappedKey = IV || AES256-CBC ($KDF_{encryption}$ (*SEMasterKey*), *rawKeyValue*, IV);

mac = HMAC-SHA256 (KDF_{mac} (*SEMasterKey*), isExportable || isSymmetric || wrappedKey);

TEE/SE Combination

Simplified "Provisioning API" Operation

1. Create Provisioning Session



1. Create a *SessionKey*
2. Seal *SessionKey*
3. Attest SessionData using *AttestationKey*
4. Return result to TEE

TEE/SE Combination

Simplified "Provisioning API" Operation

2. Create Object in Session



1. Unseal *SealedSessionKey*
2. Verify *MAC* using *SessionKey*
3. Create key-pair
4. Seal private key
5. Attest public key data using *SessionKey*
6. Return result to TEE

TEE/SE Combination

Virtualization Support – Binding keys and provisioning sessions to Virtual Machines



Actual Seal or Integrity Key: $KDF_{operation}$ (*SEMasterKey*) ⊗ *OSMasterKey*

Q & A

Question: Is this really secure?

Rhetoric answer: Do TEE- or application-based embedded PINs and/or obfuscated code actually bring any sustainable and provable security values to the table?

Question: Could there even be advantages of using the TEE for access control?

Answer: Yes, it enables combining various kinds of access controls like restricting keys to specific applications or users, as well as using device-wide PINs. A TEE can also provide challenge-response authentication and encrypted tunnels without burdening the SE. A TEE typically also supports a “trusted GUI” removing PIN-entry from potentially untrusted applications

Question: How does the SE protect keys from theft?

Answer: The “seal” contains an attribute which tells if the key is non-exportable. Such keys will not be exported unsealed to the TEE even it asks for it!